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Abstract 
Introduction. In the field of healthcare-associated infections (HCAIs), one of the most reported, studied 
and discussed sources of infections is water, partly due to its controllability, but also because healthcare 
facilities, especially hospitals, require a significant quantity of water per day. In addition to water, during 
healthcare procedures, other liquids can serve as source of infections. The present study reports a review 
of those HCAIs associated to liquid vehicles occurred in Italy during the period 2000-2014.
Method. The review focused on cases of liquid-associated HCAIs in both sporadic cases and outbreaks 
according to the definition provided by both Word Health Organization and United States’ Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Preventions in 2011. The review included all original papers published in peer-reviewed 
journals, in which the association between the infection and the exposure to contaminated water/other fluid 
was demonstrated by epidemiological and/or molecular methods. Articles describing cases due to parenteral 
transmitted pathogens (by blood or blood-derived fluids) were excluded. 
Results. During the period 2000-2014, 34 episodes have been described for a total of about 400 cases of 
infection. Isolations included genus Legionella, Pseudomonas, Serratia, Ralstonia, Burkolderia, Klebsiella 
and other pseudomonadaceae. The results confirm that HCAIs can be associated also to liquids other than 
piped water. The large majority of articles refers to hospital wards where patients with high risk of infections 
are usually admitted.
Discussion. The review highlights a great number of HCAIs, but if we consider that the large part of HCAIs 
are not reported in literature, it is clear that the burden of this phenomenon is by far higher. Many cases of 
HCAI were identified in the context of local surveillance systems, demonstrating their role in HCAI control. 
With regard to diagnosis, the isolation and identification of the etiological agent is critical to reach the 
source of infection and to plan the necessary disinfection measures. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that, 
through a multiple approach of engineering and hygiene measures, as well as surveillance ad management 
of hospital liquids, the risk for contracting “water born” HCAIs may be controlled.
Introduction
Traditionally, infections were classified 
as “community-“ or “hospital-acquired”, 
according to their place of acquisition; but, 
over the last decades, the increasing weight 
of outpatient clinical care has led to the new 
comprehensive definition of “healthcare-
associated infections” (HCAIs) (1) opposed 
to the “community-acquired infections”. 
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Actually the complexity of modern healthcare 
facilities and the increasing proportion of 
immunologically compromised patients 
make prevention of HCAIs a high priority 
(2). 
Several clinical studies report data on 
HCAIs using one of their first definition 
by Friedman et al. (3), according to which 
HCAIs are infections present at hospital 
admission or within 48 hours of admission 
in patients that fulfilled any of the following 
criteria: received intravenous therapy at 
home, wound care or specialized nursing 
care in the previous 30 days; attended a 
hospital or haemodialysis clinic or received 
intravenous chemotherapy in the previous 
30 days; were hospitalized in an acute care 
hospital for ≥2 days in the previous 90 days, 
resided in a nursing home or long-term care 
facility (3). More easily, today, HCAIs are 
considered as infections that patients acquire 
while receiving treatment for medical or 
surgical conditions (4).
Worldwide, HCAIs are the cause of 
significant morbidity, mortality, and financial 
burden; moreover, the use of antibiotics to 
treat these infections leads to increased 
microbial resistance (4-6). Nevertheless, 
the true burden of HCAIs is still unknown 
in many places, particularly in developing 
countries (4).
In Italy, there are no surveillance systems 
that routinely provide estimates of the 
national burden of such infections. One 
recent review produced by the National 
Institute of Health (ISS) reports 450,000-
700,000 HCAIs per year, 30% of which is 
considered preventable. Even more difficult 
is to stratify HCAIs according to the source 
of infection (7).
Among the numberless HCAIs sources 
of infections, one of the most reported, 
studied and discussed is water, in part 
due to its controllability (8), but also 
because healthcare facilities require a 
significant amount of water per day, to be 
used in different ways and for different 
purposes (9). Several factors have a great 
impact on the amount of water used; these 
include: bed number, number and type of 
wards and units, building age, access to 
water, general services present inside the 
structure, institutional management policies 
and awareness in managing the structure 
in order to safeguard the environment, 
climate, cultural and geographical factors. 
Therefore, the amount of water used in 
healthcare facilities varies from 200 to 1200 
L/bed/day (10). Disinfecting the drinking 
water system is an effective preventive 
measure; even though, by itself, disinfection 
is not enough for eliminating the risk of 
HCAIs, since no treatment can sterilize 
forever the water system. Therefore, the 
efficacy of any disinfection measures 
should be correctly chosen and validated 
(11), taking into account the different 
factors that contribute to the persistent 
contamination of the water systems (eg. 
large and complex water systems with areas 
of low flow that predispose to stagnation 
and biofilm formation, the presence of 
dead legs, amoebae, the variable microbial 
load of contamination, water temperatures 
that are ideal for bacterial growth, etc) 
(2,12-14). 
In addition to water, during healthcare 
procedures other liquids can serve as source 
of infections. Soap solutions, disinfectants, 
saline and other liquid vehicles, when 
contaminated at the origin or not well stored 
and managed, can cause HCAI both in 
sporadic and epidemic forms (15); and this 
is particularly true in those wards admitting 
high risk patients.
Since continued improvements in 
patient safety depend on maintaining 
a comprehensive understanding of the 
epidemiology of HCAIs (16), the present 
study reports a review of HCAIs caused 
by liquid vehicles which occurred in Italy 
during the period 2000-2014, and were 
described in a scientific publication.
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Methods
The review focused on single cases 
of liquid-related infections (LRIs) and 
liquid-related outbreaks (LROs), occurred 
in Italy from January 1, 2000 to December 
31, 2014 and present in the data banks by 
June 30, 2016. In order to obtain a more 
reliable coverage of all published reports of 
these years, a literature search using Web 
of Science and PubMed was performed. 
Outbreak database (http://www.outbreak-
database.com) was also analyzed. The 
search included the bacterial name plus 
“waterborne” and one or more of the 
following terms: “outbreak”, “case report”, 
“infection”, “nosocomial” and “Italy”. The 
pathogen name was also associated with the 
setting of appearance, such as “intensive 
care”, “dialysis”, “onco-haematological”. 
Finally, the search included “water”, “soap”, 
“fluid”, “solution”, “disinfectant” plus 
“outbreak”, “case report” and “hospital” or 
“healthcare” and “Italy”.
The review included all original papers 
published in peer-reviewed journals, 
in English or in Italian, in which the 
association between infection and exposure 
to contaminated water/other fluids was 
demonstrated with epidemiological or 
molecular methods. Furthermore, we 
excluded all articles describing outbreaks 
or cases due to fecal-oral transmission, 
parenterally transmitted pathogens via blood 
or blood-derived fluids. Pseudo-infections 
and pseudo-outbreaks were also excluded. 
Duplicate references were also excluded. 
Case definition followed (Wprld Health 
Organization 2011 (4) and United States’ 
Centers Disease Control and Prevention 
2011 indications (17).
The articles were analyzed for the 
following information: pathogens involved, 
source, method(s) used to link patient and 
environmental isolates, setting. All reported 
cases/outbreaks were classified in Class 
I-II according to the strength of evidence 
in terms of (a) epidemiologic and clinical 
laboratory data and (b) environmental 
data implicating water as the vehicle of 
transmission (17). According to a modified 
version of CDC classification (17): class I is 
assigned when both (a) and (b) criteria are 
fulfilled and adequate molecular data link 
at least one person to the implicated water 
or other fluid; class II is assigned when one 
of the two criteria (a or b) is not fulfilled 
or inadequate, but the scientific evidences 
suggest a link between al least one case 
of HCAI and an environmental exposure. 
All the studies in which the link between 
liquids and infections was neither proved nor 
suspected on the basis of scientific evidences 
were excluded. 
Case count provided in this review refers 
only to the number of cases for which 
sufficient supporting evidence of correlation 
among water/other liquid vehicles and 
infection was provided in each paper. All 
selected papers have been analyzed to 
obtain:
- cases and deaths;
- isolations and susceptibility of 
organism;
- year of occurrence;
- infection sites; 
- liquid vehicles of infections;
- settings (hospital wards or other 
healthcare structures);
- methods used to link vehicles with the 
infections.
The results have been described in two 
tables: the first table shows data regarding 
Legionella spp., the only agent included in a 
specific national surveillance system (NSS), 
among those investigated; the second refers 
to the others microorganisms (Tab. 1-2).
Results 
From January 1, 2000 to June 30, 2016, 
607 publications were identified as the result 
of the review and were reduced to 449 after 
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duplicates removal. The 449 were screened 
using title and abstracts and, out of them, 
118 were selected as pertinent and carefully 
reviewed. Articles without abstracts or 
unavailable from open source, reporting 
cases of contamination or pseudo-outbreaks, 
and articles that did not include human 
infections were excluded. Articles published 
in the observed period but regarding cases or 
outbreaks occurred before January 1, 2000 
were also excluded. After this screening 
process 37 articles were identified and their 
full-text assessed for eligibility. Finally, 33 
articles were selected and data were retrieved 
for further analysis. The other four articles 
were excluded because the same data they 
describe were reported in a different paper 
already considered in the review.
Therefore, during the period 2000-2014, 
33 articles - reporting 34 episodes - have met 
inclusion criteria. Excluding year 2014, at 
least one episode has been described in each 
of investigated years.
According to the classification reported in 
the section of Methods, 24 (71%) episodes 
belonged to Class I and other 10 (29%) 
to Class II. Isolations reported include 
genus Legionella, Pseudomonas, Serratia, 
Ralstonia, Burkolderia, Klebsiella and other 
pseudomonadaceae. The frequency of the 
episodes stratified by isolated pathogens is 
reported in Figure 1. 
As shown in table 1 and 2, the results 
confirm that HCAIs can be associated also 
with liquids other than drinking water. The 
results regarding Legionnaires’ disease (LD) 
will be described separately from those 
regarding other microorganisms, since, 
in Italy, this disease is the only one under 
special surveillance.
LRI and LRO due to Legionella spp.
In 14 episodes  (42%)  Legionella 
pneumophila (Lp) was the etiological agent 
ascertained or suspected. Table 1 shows the 
characteristics of each episode of LD and 
Class (I or II). Lp serogroup 1 (Lp1) is the 
most common, followed by Lp2-14, Lp3 
and Lp5. 
Most of episodes occurred in medical and 
surgical hospital wards (81%); some cases 
were described in dental clinics, thermal 
facilities and clinical homes for mentally 
disabled people. The type of water involved 
Figure 1 - Distribution (%) of HCAI episodes by isolated pathogens 
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included: drinking water, thermal water, 
water from cooling towers and from a tank 
for water birthing.
As shown in Table 1, at least one episode 
of LRI or LRO has been described each year, 
but 2014, during the period in exam.
In 2000 a case of LD due to Lp1 occurred 
in a 7-day old neonate after water birth in 
hospital. Since Lp1, responsible of child 
infection, was only isolated from the hospital 
pool water for water birthing, the authors 
conclude that the infant acquired the LD by 
prolonged delivery in contaminated water, 
perhaps by aspiration (18).
In the same year three surveillances 
were performed and results are reported in 
the literature. From 2000-2002, in a large 
hospital in Piedmont 9 cases of LD due to 
Lp1
 
occurred. The molecular investigation 
by ribotyping demonstrated the nosocomial 
origin (19). Other two cases of Lp1/
Philadelphia were described in Campania, 
where the pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) analysis showed high homology 
between the profiles of Lp1/Philadelphia 
isolated from both the patients and those 
from water samples (20). Finally, from 2000 
until 2009 an environmental surveillance 
was carried out in Apulia by water sampling 
of 129 healthcare facilities after a risk 
assessment. Legionella spp was found in 
102 (79.1%) of the healthcare facilities and 
in the 33.9% of the water samples. The most 
common environmental isolates were Lp1, 
Lp2-14
,
 L species.
 
In the same surveillance 
period 9 nosocomial cases were reported (21). 
The authors highlight the importance of the 
predictive value of a risk analysis and of the 
subsequent environmental microbiological 
tests, adding that laboratory diagnosis of 
LD cannot be excluded only on the basis of 
a single negative test (21). Only one case 
was nosocomial, confirmed by molecular 
investigation. This LD case, caused by Lp5, 
happened in 2001. Genotype comparison 
through PFGE between the strain isolated 
from the patient and those isolated from the 
two different wards where the patient had 
been, both contaminated by Lp5, allowed 
the source to be identified (21). 
During a surveillance (2001-2004) for 
nosocomial LD in Latium, among 43 cases 
of nosocomial pneumonia, 1 case (2.3%) 
was identified as nosocomial LD. The results 
of environmental investigations led the 
authors to conclude that the low incidence of 
nosocomial cases of LD could be associated 
with a low percentage (<20%) of positive 
water samples per semester and with a low 
contamination level (<102 CFU/L) (22). It 
was not possible to genetically compare 
clinical and environmental isolates, because, 
as in several other investigations, the bacteria 
could not be recovered from the patient.
Between 2001 and 2005, during an active 
surveillance procedure performed in three 
hospitals in Southern Italy, 12 cases of 
nosocomial LD caused by Legionella spp 
were diagnosed. Lp1
 
and
 
Lp5 were found 
(23).
An environmental surveillance carried on 
in Turin during the period 2001-2002 showed 
that 35 out of the 36 hospitals investigated 
were positive for Lp; in the same period only 
one case of LD was diagnosed by cultural 
isolation (24).
Some strains of Lp of clinical and 
environmental origin, isolated from 3 
healthcare facilities in Milan (2003-2006), 
were analyzed using three molecular typing 
methods: PFGE, amplified fragment length 
polymorphism (AFLP) and sequence based 
typing (SBT). PFGE and AFLP showed 
the correlation between a clinical and 
environmental isolates. (25, 26).
In 2003 a LD case in a 74-year-old woman 
was diagnosed, no cultural specimens were 
available. During the incubation period, the 
woman had attended a spa for hydrotherapy 
with sulphurous water by aerosol and nasal 
irrigation; high levels of Lp were isolated from 
the water in the nebulizers and nasal irrigators. 
The water system resulted Lp free after a 
combined protocol of shock treatment with 
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chlorine dioxide and peracetic acid, thermal 
shock and the restructuring of the water 
system. The authors conclude that to prevent 
Legionella colonization, disinfection treatment 
is effective if associated with carefully selected 
materials, good circuit design, and good 
maintenance practices (27). 
In 2004, an outbreak of LD caused by 
Lp1/Philadelphia occurred in a hospital in 
Northern Italy and involved 8 cases with 2 
deaths. Molecular typing by AFLP linked 
the outbreak to the contamination of the 
hospital water system and demonstrated the 
persistence of a predominant strain of Lp for 
15 years (28).
The environmental strains of Lp1
, 
obtained 
during routine surveillance carried on in 56 
health care facilities in the Piedmont region 
(period 2004-2009) were typed using the 
monoclonal antibody MAb 3/1 of the Dresden 
Panel and compared with the number of cases 
that each healthcare facility reported during 
the study period. A statistically significant 
association between the presence of cases 
and colonization by MAb 3/1-positive 
Lp strains was demonstrated, suggesting 
that hospitals colonized by more virulent 
strains should be aware of the increased 
risk and should consider the opportunities 
of increasing their monitoring efforts and 
implementing more effective contamination 
control strategies (29).
Menacci et al. reported a case of a 
nosocomial LD by Lp3
 
occurred in 2010 
in a 70 year old man with non-Hodgkin 
lymphoma. Diagnosis was carried out by 
culture and real-time polymerase chain 
reaction of bronchoalveolar lavage fluid. A 
hospital environmental investigation revealed 
that the hospital water system was highly 
colonized by Lp1, Lp3, Lp4 e Lp8. After the 
preventive measures adopted, no further cases 
of LD have been observed. Molecular typing 
of Lp clinical and environmental isolates was 
carried out by using the AFLP method, and 
the genomic profile of the Lp clinical strain 
matched with that of the Lp3 strain (30).
A confirmed fatal case of nosocomial 
LD due to Lp3
 
Olda strains, in a 63-year-
old female patient, was reported in 2010 
(31). In the study the source of infection 
was determined by using nested-SBT on 
post-mortem tissue samples, in absence of 
clinical isolates. Environmental strains were 
typed by SBT. AFLP was also used to type 
Legionella isolates.
Finally, in 2011, LD was diagnosed in an 
82-year-old woman admitted to the intensive 
care unit. A Lp1
 
strain, isolated from the 
bronchial aspirate of a patient who received 
treatment in a dental clinic, was compared 
with environmental strains collected from the 
water of the same clinic using three different 
typing methods, which could demonstrate 
a homology between them. Monoclonal 
antibody typing (MBT) ascribed all the 
strains to subgroup Benidorm, one of the 
most virulent; SBT showed the same rare 
sequence type (ST 593) and AFLP showed 
identical genomic patterns (32).
LRI and LRO due to other microorganisms
As shown in Table 2, the review allowed 
to identify other 19 episodes, most of 
which (74%) fall in class I. Water caused 
the outbreak in 32% of episodes, while the 
remaining ones have been determined by 
several other fluids.
With regard to HCAI caused by 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, this agent was 
involved in 6 (18%) outbreaks; the total cases 
accounted at 54 all in class I, 9 of which 
(17%) died.
In 2002, an outbreak of P aeruginosa 
infection in 6 patients who shared, during 
different periods, the same 2 rooms of a Bone 
Marrow Transplantation Unit (BMTU) of a 
Hospital in Florence, was reported. AFLP 
analysis of isolates from patients and from 
the showers’ water suggested a common 
environmental source of infection (33).
Prospero et al. reported an outbreak of 
P aeruginosa catheter-related bloodstream 
infection (CRBSI) occurred in 2004 in a large 
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hospital in Ancona. The environmental strain 
was isolated from a mixture of heparin and 
saline solution. Clinical and environmental 
isolates were compared at PFGE, showing 
that the outbreak was due to a single clone 
of P aeruginosa (34).
In 2005, 9 patients developed P 
aeruginosa bloodstream infection (BSI) in 
a neurosurgical intensive care unit (NSICU) 
of Rome during a two-month-period. 
Environmental strains were isolated from 
a plasma-expander solution and tap water. 
All clinical and plasma-expander strains 
displayed the same PFGE pattern, whereas 
the water strains were unrelated to the 
outbreak (35).
During the period July 2005 - June 2007, 
in the NICU of a University hospital in 
Naples, 135 neonates became colonized by 
P aeruginosa; among them 11 developed a 
severe infection. PFGE analysis showed a 
homology among the profiles of clinical and 
environmental strains (36).
In 2006 six severe cases of P aeruginosa 
infections were reported in the Hematopoietic 
Stem Cell Transplant (HSCT) of a hospital in 
Florence. AFLP analysis of the isolates from 
the six patients showed the clonality of four 
strains; moreover, an isolate obtained from 
a soap dispenser located in the anteroom 
showed a significant molecular similarity 
(dice index higher than 0.93) with the four 
clinical strains (37).
In 2007 an outbreak of P aeruginosa 
severe infections was described in a hospital 
of Rome. It occurred in the HSCT Unit and 
involved 18 patients, 4 of whom died. The 
clonal relationship between P aeruginosa 
isolates was assessed by means of Random 
Amplified Polymorphic DNA (RAPD) 
analysis, macrorestriction analysis by PFGE, 
and Multilocus Sequence Typing (MLST). 
Of the eighteen cases, five constitute a 
significant molecular cluster of infection. A 
P. aeruginosa strain with the same genetic 
fingerprint and sequence type (ST175) as 
the strains of clinical origin was isolated 
from a heavily contaminated triclosan 
soap dispenser. The authors conclude that 
the triclosan soap dispenser acted as a 
common continuous source of P aeruginosa 
infection. Since P aeruginosa is intrinsically 
unsusceptible to triclosan, the use of 
triclosan-based disinfectant formulations 
should be avoided in those healthcare 
settings hosting patients at high risk of P 
aeruginosa infection (38).
Serratia marcescens (S marcescens) has 
been reported in 4 outbreaks (12%), mainly 
occurred in neonatal ICUs (75%); total cases 
accounted at 63 (6 class I and 57 class II), 5 
of whom died (8%).
In 2004, an outbreak of 6 cases of 
bloodstream infection due to S marcescens 
occurred in a surgical ward of a hospital 
in Brescia (39). Four patients had severe 
sepsis, but there were no deaths. The 
isolates were resistant to tetracycline and 
amoxicillin-clavulanic acid. Although a 
definite source for the outbreak was not 
identified, the Authors speculated that the 
lack of adherence to hand hygiene practices 
may had led to contamination of bags of total 
parenteral nutrition solution.
In 2007, Ligozzi et al report the 
comparison of three molecular methods used 
to investigate an outbreak of S marcescens 
infections in a neonatal intensive care unit 
(NICU) in Verona (40). Six patients developed 
infections; one experienced bacteremia, one 
conjunctivitis, one conjunctivitis and urinary 
infection, two urinary infection, and one 
umbilical wound infection. S marcescens 
was isolated from the milk samples and in 
three cases the isolates had a PFGE pattern 
comparable to clinical isolates. Moreover, 
the isolates from the NICU presented the 
same antimicrobial susceptibility profile and 
resulted resistant to ampicillin, amoxicillin-
clavulanic acid, and cefuroxime.
In April 2011, an outbreak of S marcescens 
infections/colonisations occurred in the 
neonatal intensive care unit of Pescara 
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General Hospital. Rapid microbiological 
investigations led to the identification of 
five cases of likely cross-transmissed sepsis. 
Two low birth weight neonates died. The 
environmental investigation detected S 
marcescens from two soap dispensers. Hand 
carriage, although not demonstrated in this 
outbreak, was the most likely way of spread 
to and from soap dispensers (41).
Risk factors associated with S marcescens 
HCAI were evaluated by a 10-years (2003-
2012) retrospective case-control study in a 
NICU of a tertiary level hospital in Modena. 
S marcescens was identified in 127 neonates: 
43 developed infection and 3 died. Seven 
clusters were recorded due to 12 unrelated 
clones, which persisted for years in the 
ward, although no environmental source was 
found. Genotyping was effective in tracing 
the evolution and dynamics of the clones 
demonstrating their long-term persistence 
in the ward (15). 
Three outbreaks due to Ralstonia pickettii 
(Rp) were also reported, accounting for 9% 
of episodes. The total cases described are 41 
(13 class I and 28 class II); among them two 
patients died (5%).
The first outbreak occurred in 2001 in 
Perugia, involving 4 patients. The patients 
showed a systemic inflammatory response 
syndrome. PFGE and RAPD were used to 
investigate the relatedness of Rp isolates. 
Among the isolates with PFGE type A 
profile, RAPD identified strains R1 and 
R2. The source of infection was identified 
in a contaminated parenteral nutrition 
solution (42). The isolates were resistant to 
aminoglycosides and aztreonam.
In the same article, another outbreak due 
to Rp, occurred in 2002 in the same hospital, 
was described; it involved 9 patients, 2 of 
whom died; identical PFGE profiles and 
RAPD patterns have been observed. In this 
case the source of infections was identified in 
the heparin solution used to flush the central 
venous catheter (42).
Between 2001 and 2002, 28 cases of 
sepsis were reported in a Nephrology Unit 
of Como. Rp was isolated from the biofilm 
inside the equipment for hemodialysis, 
probably due to a contaminated liquid 
solution used for parenteral infusion (43).
Bulkholderia spp has been reported in 
2 outbreaks (6%). The total cases of HCAI 
due to Bulkholderia spp are represented by 
51 invasive infections, with 6 deaths. 
A catheter-related outbreak of bacteraemia 
involving 38 patients in two haemodialysis 
units was reported in Verona in 2004-2005. 
Burkholderia cenocepacia (B cenocepacia) 
strains were isolated from human blood and 
from an individually wrapped disinfection 
napkin soaked in quaternary ammonium that 
was contained in a commercially available, 
sterile dressing kit used to handle central 
venous catheters. Microorganisms isolated 
from blood cultures and from the napkin 
were identified by standard procedures and 
confirmed as B cenocepacia by molecular 
analysis. Using PFGE analysis, the clinical 
isolates were closely related to the B 
cenocepacia isolated from the napkin (44).
A B cepacia complex outbreak occurred 
among ventilated non-cystic fibrosis patients 
in an ICU in Modena: 33 colonized and 13 
infected patients were involved, 6 of them died. 
Molecular investigations conducted by RAPD 
demonstrated that the outbreak was associated 
with a contaminated mouthwash (45).
Two outbreaks (6%), attributed to 
Klebsiella pneumoniae (K pneumoniae), 
have involved 25 patients, causing sepsis 
and other severe pathologies. The first one 
regards the neonatal ICU of a teaching 
hospital of Naples where several outbreaks of 
K pneumoniae occurred from 1996 to 2004. 
Molecular typing of K pneumoniae isolates 
identified three distinct PFGE profiles. 
Strains of PFGE profile A were isolated 
during an epidemic in 1996, while isolates 
of PFGE profiles B and C were sequentially 
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isolated from September 2002 to December 
2004, when 233 colonizations and 19 
infections by K pneumoniae occurred. PFGE 
demonstrated the correspondence between 
environmental and clinical strains (46).
The second outbreak refers to six cases 
of primary bloodstream infections sustained 
by ampicillin/piperacillin-resistant K 
pneumoniae, observed over a two-month 
period in a NICU in Bologna. In order to 
determine genetic relatedness among strains, 
repetitive extragenic palindromic PCR 
(Rep-PCR) was applied. The results were 
confirmed by arbitrary primed polymerase 
chain reaction (AP-PCR) and RAPD. 
Rep-PCR confirmed that isolates of K 
pneumoniae from all six infants and from 
the saccharose solution belonged to the same 
genotype. All the K pneumoniae isolates 
obtained from the clinical samples had the 
same antibiogram, showing resistance to 
ampicillin and piperacillin (47).
Finally, 2 episodes due to other 
pseudomonadaceae have been described.
In 2005 an outbreak of Acinetobacter 
baumannii (A baumannii) occurred in the 
ICU of a hospital in Rome. The outbreak 
involved 14 patients whose isolates, most 
frequently recovered from bronchoalveolar 
lavage, were multidrug-resistant. A 
baumannii strains with a similar antibiotic 
susceptibility pattern were isolated from the 
environment. PFGE identified a single clone 
from both the clinical and environmental 
isolates (washbasin and other surfaces). 
During the ICU stay, 4 patients died, though 
none of the deaths was directly attributable 
to A baumannii infection. (48). 
A case of meningitis due to Brevundimonas 
versicularis (B versicularis) has been described 
in 2006 in a 24-year-old male, without any 
previous diseases, hospitalized for concussion 
as a result of a fight, after he underwent a 
neurosurgical operation. B vesicularis was 
identified in the washbasins and water taps of 
the rooms in which the patient stayed (49). 
Discussion
The present review allowed the selection 
of 34 episodes describing HCAIs associated 
to liquid vehicles in Italy during the period 
2000-2014, causing about 400 cases of 
infection. If we consider the limits of the 
research methods used and the awareness 
that large part of HCAIs are not reported in 
literature, it is clear that the burden of this 
phenomenon is by far greater. The large 
majority of articles refers to hospital wards 
where patients with high risk of infections 
are usually admitted. Therefore, special 
attention in the procedures and their respect 
should be paid in these settings. Furthermore, 
correct physical design of hospital is an 
essential component to minimize the risk of 
infection transmission. For example, Hota 
et al (50), describing the placement and 
role of sinks as source of an ICU HCAIs 
outbreak, showed that, although proximity 
of handwashing stations to the bedside is 
important, its placement too close can be a 
risk as well. The shallow depth of the basin 
resulting in splashing of contaminants from 
the drain to surfaces adjacent to the sink 
and directly onto the patient was the key 
factor resulting in this outbreak of serious 
infections and fatalities. Based on this and 
other evidences, the US Guidelines for 
Design and Construction of Hospitals and 
Healthcare Facilities, 2010 (51) recommend 
to design handwashing stations in the ICUs 
and other wards in a way that could reduce 
the risk of microorganisms’ spread (51, 
52).
While many articles describe single or 
epidemic cases occasionally diagnosed, 
it is interesting to underline that some 
other articles report cases of HCAIs, that 
have been identified in the context of local 
routine surveillance systems (19, 20, 25, 26). 
Therefore, building up surveillance systems 
can be considered as an effective control 
procedure, and their implementation should 
be expanded and improved. This is in line 
427Liquids-related healthcare associated infections in Italy
with other findings according to which, an 
effective clinical strategy of HCAI prevention 
includes aggressive clinical surveillance 
with ad hoc further investigation in case of 
detection of every single case (2).
With regard to the sources of infection, 
water should be considered of particular 
relevance due to the numerous occasions 
of exposure (5), but some other liquids 
can be considered efficient vehicles of 
pathogens. This evidence should be taken 
into account when identifying the procedure 
of prevention, especially if we consider 
that even disinfectants are listed among 
these liquids. Moreover, in some cases the 
isolated pathogens were investigated for 
their antimicrobial resistance, allowing to 
identify the most appropriate therapy to 
be adopted according to the HCAI agents 
circulating (46).
Another interesting aspect to consider 
is the healthcare facilities where the HCAI 
were acquired; as a matter of facts, besides 
the hospitals, other contexts, such as the 
spa facilities, seem to have a role in the 
presence of some risk factors, for example 
water temperature can encourage the 
growth of microorganisms causing HCAI. 
Moreover, guests attending this type of 
facilities can be at risk for infection when 
are undergoing inhalation therapy. A very 
accurate management of these facilities is, 
therefore, required to avoid infections such 
as those caused by Legionella spp. and not 
always national guidelines provide clear 
suggestions on their management; on the 
contrary, prevention systems should be put 
in place for the well-being of clients and 
patients (53). 
With regard to etiological agents, a large 
number of articles are dedicated to Legionella 
spp, but the number of cases is not always as 
high as in HCAI caused by other pathogens. 
Although, many other microorganism were 
identified in our review, we did not find 
any report regarding outbreak caused by 
Mycobacterium avium, currently considered 
the causal agent of the majority of non-
tuberculous mycobacteria infections and the 
most prevalent Mycobacterium in drinking 
water (54). Moreover, information available 
on disease incidence for opportunistic 
plumbing pathogens indicates other emerging 
microorganisms, like Naegleria fowleri, 
a brain-eating amoeba that prefers warm 
aquatic environments, recently detected 
in plumbing and linked to deaths in the 
southern United States (55).
With regard to diagnosis, in particular 
LD shows some difficulties (often it is not 
a routine laboratory practice, urine antigen 
emission is not constant, the antibody 
response is slow, etc.), therefore a special 
attention must be paid. Moreover, the 
selected articles demonstrated that the great 
majority of LD cases are cause by Lp1; 
this result is consistent with those provided 
by NSS (56), but the problem is that the 
majority of cases reported are diagnosed by 
urinary antigen detection only; therefore, 
serogroups different from Lp1 are not always 
detected. On the contrary, the isolation and 
identification of the etiological agent is 
rarely performed, but it is fundamental to 
reach the source of infection and to program 
the necessary disinfection measures, so 
limiting the spread of the disease to both 
patients and health staff (21).
The cultural methods should always 
be considered the first choice to allow 
the comparison between clinical and 
environmental strains. With regard to 
this issue, different methods have been 
described. In order to correlate clinical 
and environmental strains, phenotyping 
methods such as serotyping, biochemical 
tests, antibiotic susceptibility, and phage 
typing were mainly used in older studies. 
Unfortunately, these methods appear to be 
weakly discriminatory in distinguishing 
closely related strains (57). Molecular typing 
techniques were performed more recently, 
when the usefulness of such methods for the 
identification of the environmental source of 
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the outbreak was confirmed. DNA banding 
pattern-based methods were the most 
frequently applied genotyping techniques. 
Among these, PFGE is considered the ‘gold 
standard’ for subtyping many bacteria. As 
this method has the advantage of being used 
in several countries, many web resources 
for bacterial genotyping exist; however, 
it is time and labour consuming and it 
lacks reproducibility and inter-laboratory 
comparability. Many other techniques are 
available, such as DNA hybridization-based 
(microarrays) and DNA sequencing-based 
methods (multilocus sequence typing and 
sequence-based typing). Each has advantages 
and limitations that make them useful in 
some studies and restrictive in others. The 
choice will depend on the available skill 
level, the resources of the laboratory and the 
study purpose (57). 
As previously reported by Falkenham 
et al, there are several traits shared by 
the microorganisms that we found as 
water related HCAI agents: the ability 
to adhere to surfaces and form biofilms 
that make the microorganism also more 
resistant to disinfectants, survival at high 
temperatures, and growth in free-living 
phagocytic amoebae (54). These factors 
impact directly the human exposure during 
health care procedures. Furthermore, the 
ageing of hospital buildings and the need 
of continuing structural and technology 
adjustment justify the presence, almost 
continuous, of yards in healthcare facilities, 
that interact in many ways with the hospital, 
exposing patients to further risk factors (58). 
Therefore, only by a multiple approaches 
of engineering and hygiene measures as 
well as surveillance and management for 
hospital water it is possible to reduce the 
risk of contracting water related HCAI (58). 
Hospitals should have prospective water 
safety plans that include preventive measures, 
as prevention is preferable to remediation of 
contaminated hospital water distribution 
systems (2). Moreover, it is essential for 
healthcare personnel to know reservoirs and 
transmission pathways of these infections 
for adopting the correct control measures 
of prevention (59), especially because, as 
showed by our review, not only water, but 
other liquids are responsible for HCAI onset; 
therefore, the respect of good practice should 
be extended to all procedures that can pose 
at risk the patients. 
Riassunto
Le sostanze liquide possono costituire un efficiente 
veicolo d’infezioni correlate all’assistenza? Una 
revisione dei casi riportati in Italia nel period 
2000-2014
Introduzione. Tra le infezioni correlate all’assistenza 
(ICA), le più studiate sono quelle veicolate dall’acqua, 
sia perché maggiormente suscettibili di piani di controllo, 
sia per la grande quantità di acqua utilizzata in ambiente 
ospedaliero. Tuttavia, anche altri liquidi possono essere 
associati ad ICA; perciò, il presente studio riporta i 
risultati di una revisione scientifica sulle ICA associate 
a veicoli liquidi verificatesi in Italia nel periodo 2000-
2014.
Metodi. La revisione della letteratura si è incentrata 
sui casi di ICA, sia in forma epidemica che sporadica, in 
accordo con le definizioni ufficiali fornite nel 2011 da Or-
ganizzazione Mondiale della Sanità e Centri Americani 
per il Controllo delle Malattie. Sono stati considerati tutti 
gli articoli pubblicati in riviste scientifiche con dimostrata 
associazione (epidemiologica e/o molecolare) tra ICA e 
veicoli fluidi. Sono stati esclusi casi di ICA associati a 
trasmissione parenterale (tramite sangue e derivati). 
Risultati. Nel periodo 2000-2014, sono stati descritti 
34 episodi di ICA associati a veicoli liquidi, per un totale 
di circa 400 casi di malattia. I microganismi interessati 
appartengono ai generi Legionella, Pseudomonas, 
Serratia, Ralstonia, Burkolderia, Klebsiella e altre 
pseudomonadaceae. I risultati hanno confermato che le 
ICA possono essere associate anche ad altri liquidi oltre 
l’acqua e che la gran parte dei casi riguardava reparti con 
pazienti ad alto rischio infettivo.
Discussione. La revisione ha evidenziato un alto 
numero di casi di ICA; tuttavia, considerando che non 
tutte le ICA costituiscono oggetto di articoli scientifici, 
si può immaginare quale sia la reale dimensione del 
problema. Molti casi sono stati identificati attraverso 
sistemi locali di sorveglianza e questo dimostra il ruolo 
centrale della sorveglianza nel controllo delle ICA. Così 
come appare centrale il ruolo dell’isolamento e identifi-
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cazione del microrganismo responsabile di ICA, al fine 
di identificarne l’origine e programmare i più corretti 
interventi di controllo. Pertanto, in considerazione dei 
vari aspetti emersi dalla revisione, solo attraverso un 
approccio multidisciplinare è possibile il controllo di 
questo fenomeno.
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